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I.

Introduction
The candidate countries for accession to the European Union (EU) are presently revising their economic policies in the direction that will enable them to establish the framework of competitive market system that is compatible with that prevailing in the EU.
Modifications in monetary and exchange rate regimes in these countries are crucial for their successful monetary convergence to the eurozone.
The key assumption underlying this analysis is that the candidate countries for the EU/EMU accession need to demonstrate capability to manage risk premiums, particularly the inflation risk, the exchange rate risk and the default risk premiums, as a necessary condition for their successful monetary convergence. They need to adopt an appropriate monetary policy that will facilitate management of these risk premiums in the most effective way.
In technical terms, monetary convergence of the candidates to the eurozone entails achieving some essential benchmarks for price stability, as well as interest rate and exchange rate stability that are consistent with the criteria outlined by the Maastricht Treaty. These criteria call for establishing predetermined targets of monetary stability that ought to be met upon the EU accession, and at the later stage, the subsequent entry to the EMU. These future targets can be and ought to be outlined at the present time, and because they pertain to the future ambitious benchmarks of low inflation, stable exchange rates and low interest rates, the monetary convergence strategies and policies ought to be forward-looking and highly transparent.
Possible choices for monetary convergence strategies have been widely discussed in the recent literature; they range from calls for a unilateral euroization at the earliest possible time (Begg et.al., 2001) , to arguments favoring a more gradual path based on autonomous monetary policies such as flexible inflation targeting (Orlowski, 2001a and 2001b) or flexible exchange rate targeting (Bofinger and Wollmershäuser, 2001 ).
This study is based on the argument that monetary convergence of the candidates can be effectively achieved through relying on direct inflation targeting (DIT) rather than currency pegs. Consistently, the convergence process may be facilitated by policies which primary task is to dampen inflation, and only later to focus on exchange rate stability.
A premature leap to unilateral euroization carries several important 3 disadvantages. Most importantly, it is unlikely to resolve a critical issue of a default risk and it might even exacerbate it if the candidates' financial institutions are not adequately prepared for a head-on competition with their foreign counterparts. In essence, such early euroization means switching to the environment of:
a. considerably lower interest rates b. weaker currency (the euro), since at the present time domestic currencies of the leading EU contenders are supported by very high interest rates, well above those prevailing in the eurozone
In principle, euroization might eradicate the inflation risk and the exchange rate risk premiums, without improving the default risk premium. (The latter is a direct function of improvements in corporate governance among domestic financial and business institutions, which may take some time to materialize in the EU candidate countries).
Because of the prevalence of the default risk, monetary policy adjustments ought to be synchronized with institutional advancements, mainly in the financial sectors of the candidate countries. This can be accomplished by efforts aimed at mitigating inflation and exchange rate risk premiums.
I envisage monetary convergence to the eurozone as a two-step process. It shall first begin with strict inflation targeting (SIT) policies that are aimed solely on reducing inflation. Once a reasonable degree of price stability is achieved, the candidate countries may consider applying the second step of convergence, namely a flexible inflationtargeting (FIT) regime that will combine a predominant target of low inflation with a supporting target of exchange rate stability.
The underlying hypothesis for the empirical testing is that the candidates follow DIT regimes based on policy reactions to most recently observed inflation. Their preparation for the EMU entry will require adoption of a system of inflation-forecast targeting with a 'conditional' target of exchange rate stability. Following this premise, this study proposes a forward-looking model of managing inflation and exchange rate risk premiums vis-à-vis those prevailing in the eurozone, within the framework of strict and flexible inflation targeting regimes. The model is formalized in Section II. The empirical testing of the model for the leading EU candidates, namely, for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, is presented in Section III. The central question for the 4 empirical testing is whether the candidates have begun pursuing the monetary convergence process to the euro that follows the precepts of the presented model.
II. IRP-ERP Model
The connection between inflation and exchange rate risk premiums and choices of various monetary policy regimes is derived from the extensive theoretical discussion and empirical examination in the recent literature. The traditional approach to policies aimed at targeting inflation or price stability has focused on the volatility of output as a subsequent result or cost of reducing volatility of inflation (Svensson, 1999a) .
Nonetheless, a number of recent studies have emphasized the impact of inflation targeting on volatility of both real and nominal exchange rates. Specifically, Haldane (1997) presents compelling evidence that the inflation-targeting framework is likely to aggravate stability of exchange rates. In a similar vein, several models have focused on pass-through effects of currency depreciation on inflation (via rising import prices), as initiated by the seminal study by Ball (1999 The IRP can be reiterated as
In this form, the IRP in the open-economy framework with forward-looking expectations is the difference between the interest rate differential and the inflation differential, both of 6 which account for some future targets that are consistent with the corresponding variables forecasted for the common currency system. Moreover, aligning purely domestic inflation risk premium with the one expected to prevail in the common currency system is warranted by the conditions identified in the recent literature on 'dollarization' as prerequisites for entry into a common currency system. Specifically, Alesina and Barro (2001) emphasize that a successful entry into a common currency area requires wellestablished co-movements between key monetary variables of the candidate and of the common currency bloc.
The exchange rate risk premium (ERP) can be derived from the simplified version of the purchasing power parity (PPP) condition in the framework of an open economy that is pursuing active convergence to the common currency system. Accordingly, the inflation target for this economy * + t t / τ π is consistent with the forecasted inflation in the common currency system (the eurozone) and the exchange rate target * + t t e / τ is conditional upon the inflation target. Under these circumstances, the ERP can be stated as
where t Ψ reflects the ERP.
In order to ensure a full consistency between monetary policy instruments and goals in the open economy framework, the ERP needs to satisfy also the international
The monetary policy instrument rule derived from (2) can be specified as (4) gives
The relationship between ERP and IRP that is shown in (6) reflects policy choices in the forward-looking setting since policy monitoring focuses on the differences between current inflation and exchange rates and their respective target levels for the τ -periods ahead. Translating this relationship into the framework of monetary convergence to the common currency system implies that the current exchange rate t e is expected to converge to the exchange rate target * + t t e / τ and the current inflation d t π will be also moving closer to the inflation target * + t t / τ π . In order to accomplish these tasks, the candidates will have to focus on improvements in policy credibility and in the overall stability of their financial system that will eradicate both the ERP ( t Ψ ) and the IRP ( t Φ ).
As proposed in this study, a proper sequencing of such policy should follow a two-step process, which at the initial stage relies on minimizing the IRP and reducing it to a predetermined target that can be specified as
Only later when this target is fully accomplished, the monetary authority will be able to apply the advanced stage by redirecting efforts onto achieving the exchange rate target that can be specified as
In practical terms, these tasks may be accomplished by applying a policy convergence process that begins with a SIT approach, followed a combination of inflation targeting with some attention to exchange rate stability within the FIT framework, and ended by some form of exchange rate targeting in the form of a hard peg or preferably a full euroization.
Taking into consideration the proposed sequence of monetary convergence, policy makers will need to devise corresponding rules for strict and flexible forward-looking 8 inflation targeting regimes. The interest rate rule within the SIT forward-looking framework can be derived from (5) and prescribed as
Within this policy framework, the central bank will adjust the difference between the current interest rate and the implied target rate for monetary convergence. The difference is based exclusively on the deviation between the actual and the target inflation, taking into consideration the prevailing inflation risk premium. This premium can be lowered along with gains in monetary policy credibility, as financial markets perceive them.
Once the prevailing t Φ converges into the IRP target
Φ that is required for accession to the common currency system, policy makers may decide to switch into the FIT framework that gradually pays more attention to the exchange rate stability.
Subsequently, the instrument rule can be modified as
The forward-looking FIT regime will initially begin from a stronger weight δ assigned to the deviation of actual inflation from the forecast, or convergence target level. If the IRP falls to the satisfactory level, the central bank will choose to increase the policy emphasis on the exchange rate stability target (by reducing δ ). Realistically, the new targeting formula will enable the monetary authority to reduce the ERP to the level that will ensure a smooth entry to a common currency system.
The process of monetary convergence that begins from SIT and is followed by FIT becomes perhaps more lucid and easier to interpret if it is presented graphically (Figure 1 ). 
In the scenario outlined in Figure 1 , the central bank begins the convergence process at point A reflecting a strict inflation target system that is aimed solely at dampening the inflation risk premium to the target level t Φ , which might be consistent with the common currency area entry target
However, the initial containment of inflation may result in large variability of the exchange rate or, in other words, in a large and excessive ERP. To resolve this issue, the central bank will decide to change its policy approach into FIT that emphasizes reduction of both the IRP and the ERP. The combination of IRP and ERP may get settled at point C, which denotes reaching a high degree of both risk premiums. Point C is located on the same credibility locus L 0 as the initial point A, thereby both points are located on the worst possible credibility scenario in the presented model. Switching the policy to FIT and reaching 'only' a combination of high inflation and exchange rate risk premiums at point C epitomizes a failure of FIT to reduce both risk premiums. FIT becomes partially successful in lowering the ERP and IRP when point C' is reached, since this point is located on a better credibility locus L 1.
Ideally, FIT will help finalize the convergence process if both premiums are reduced to C'' thus to the respective target levels at t Φ and t Ψ . Point C'' lies on the L 2 locus that reflects best possible credibility gains, which are satisfactory for entry into the common 10 currency system. By assumption, although the origin (point 0) of this ERP-IRP tradeoff reflects a fully successful convergence of both risk premiums to their respective levels that prevail within the common currency system, their t Φ and t Ψ targets can be viewed as sufficient for a formal accession.
The empirical assessment of monetary policy adjustments focuses on the central bank reaction function that is prescribed by the non-linear trajectory AC'B outlined in Figure 1 . This path of policy change can be formulated as a reciprocal function
In terms of definitions of these risk premiums identified by (2) and (3) 
III. Interdependence between IRP and ERP in EU Candidate Countries
The empirical investigation of the proposed model focuses on addressing two points; it attempts to answer whether there is:
1. a path-dependent relationship between both risk premiums, 11 2. a simultaneous decline in both the IRP and the ERP that would prove a successful pursuit of monetary convergence to the eurozone.
Since both investigated variables represent two diverse components of financial risk, it is appropriate to evaluate volatility of both the exchange rate of national currencies expressed in euros and to use the interest rate differential adjusted for inflation differential vis-à-vis Germany, as a proxy for the inflation risk premium. For the purpose of empirical investigation, the model prescribed by (11) 
where superscripts GER denote the corresponding German short-term interest rates and inflation rates. Equation (12) allows for a rough approximation of co-movements between exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro and inflation risk premiums relative to those prevailing in Germany.
The recent practical experience of the leading EU candidates suggests that both the IRP and ERP time series are likely to display high volatility and instability of error terms. It is because the examined economies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are all susceptible to contagion effects of external financial crises that entail temporary, uneven shocks to both risk premiums and instigate diverse monetary policy responses.
The unstable effects of temporary shocks to risk premiums introduce heteroscedasticity to the investigated relationship, which in essence precludes using parametric (OLS) methods of estimation. Due to the expected prevalence of heteroscedasticity, the generalized auto-regressive conditional heteroscedasticity -GARCH (1,1) estimation technique is chosen in order to assess the link between the IRP and the ERP in all three countries. The headline CPI inflation and three-month Treasury bill rates are used in all three cases in order to ensure comparability of data. The time series begins as of January is cut-off to account for distinctively different monetary policies that were based on currency pegs at that time. A possible inclusion of that period would introduce a strong bias of a stable exchange rate and low ERP -a situation not fully comparable to the recent autonomous policies based on DIT in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary 4 .
The GARCH (1,1) model uses the conditional variance, which is the one-period ahead forecast variance based on past information 5 . The GARCH specification of the investigated relationship between IRP and ERP is
as well as the function
The lag of the squared residual In addition, the empirical test shows strong ARCH effects on IRP, meaning that the Hungarian inflation risk has been strongly influenced by the news and the effects from the preceding period. This implies a highly proactive, discretionary approach to monetary policy by the National Bank of Hungary. Another interesting and perhaps a bit surprising observation is a low and negative mean value of the IRP relative to Germany, proving that the overall Hungarian monetary policy has been relatively expansionary.
One possible reason for it would be the need to gear policy instruments to the weakened exchange rate through the crawling devaluation mechanism in the presence of strong capital inflows that the country in fact experienced in the second half of the 1990s. Low interest rates and strong capital inflows undeniably contributed to the persistently high inflation. Consequently, the combination of low interest rates aimed at sustaining the weak exchange rate and tenaciously high inflation had to result in the low IRP.
The test also proves that the interactions between IRP and ERP have not been Operating targets follow a carefully designed linear trajectory of CPI inflation that is subject to monthly monitoring; they are not specified on the year-end basis. In essence, the positive relationship between IRP and ERP in the Czech Republic indicates feedback effects of exchange rates to changes in interest rates that have been aimed primarily at taming inflation. Notes: as in Table 1 .
Source: author's own calculations, based on the Czech National Bank and the IMF data.
The GARCH test for the Czech Republic also shows prevalence of ARCH effects, although they are somewhat weaker than in the case of Hungary. The news from the previous period do play some role in the underlying IRP changes in the Czech system.
The GARCH effects are rather undefined and unstable. Noticeably, the sum of coefficients of ARCH and GARCH terms is close to unity indicating a high persistence of the IRP process. Unlike in Hungary, the overall (the mean) IRP in the Czech Republic is positive, although quite low. It implies that the degree of tightness of the Czech monetary policy relative to that of Germany (the Bundesbank) and, after the eurozone inception, of the European Central Bank has been rather mild. However, this does not mean that the Czech National Bank has been responding closely to the monetary conditions prevailing in the eurozone. The high standard deviation of IRP fluctuations relative to the mean reflects considerable instability of this pattern.
There have been at least two major deviations from the overall path of IRP relative to ERP in the Czech Republic, which can be detected in A different set of monetary conditions is displayed by the GARCH analysis for Poland (Table 3 ). The striking difference comparing to the two previous cases is the very high, positive mean value of the IRP implying a persistently tighter stance of Poland's monetary policy. Thus disinflation and monetary convergence in Poland has been so far implemented through considerably higher inflation risk premiums than those in the neighboring EU candidate countries. This situation indirectly implies that Poland's monetary policy and convergence are yet to gain the 'foundational credibility' as it is prescribed by this study. In a similar vein to the previous cases, the Polish IRP relative to ERP is strongly influenced by the ARCH-term proving that the inflation and exchange rate risk premiums in Poland follow a highly persistent first-order autoregressive process. Unlike in the Czech case, but in a similar pattern to that of Hungary, there is an inverse, significant relationship between both risk premiums. This demonstrates that strong and high IRPs were accompanied by the overall volatility of the Polish zloty during most of the …………… insert Figure 4 here ……………………….
Source: author's own estimation.
In sum, the presented tests show that the three candidate countries are yet to follow the FIT policy framework outlined in the model prescribed in this study. The IRP-ERP relationships are still a bit ambiguous and not very robust, as proven at least by low AIC indicators. The Czech Republic seems to be most successful in lowering both risk premiums simultaneously, which proves that the Czech DIT strategy has been at least partially successful in facilitating both tasks of monetary convergence to the euro, that is the lower IRP and ERP.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This study proposes the path of monetary convergence of the EU/EMU candidates that emphasizes accomplishing two primary objectives, namely, a reduction of both the inflation risk premium and the exchange rate risk premium. 
